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“I riro whenua atu me hoki whenua mai”: The return of land and 





The Waikato-Tainui raupatu settlement signed in 1995 focused on the return of land to address 
grievances related to the war and confiscation that marked the Waikato region in the 1860s. 
Negotiations regarding the return of land focused on the tribal entity into which lands would 
be vested, which specific lands they would be returned and in what legal form they would be 
utilised. The negotiations regarding the return of land to Waikato-Tainui represented a situation 
under which the Crown’s power was reinvented rather than weakened. Compromises were 




The importance of land to Māori has been paramount throughout New Zealand’s history. In 
the Māori version of the Treaty of Waitangi, Article Two guaranteed to Māori “te tino 
rangatiratanga,” what Claudia Orange describes as the unqualified exercise of their 
chieftanship, over “ratou w[h]enua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa,” their lands, 
villages and treasures. The English version of Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed 
to Māori “the full exclusive undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates.”1 The intimate 
connections between the people (“tangata”) and land (“whenua”) have been signified in a 
number of different Māori proverbs such as: “Te toto o te tangata he kai, te oranga o te tangata 
he whenua” (“The lifeblood of a person is derived from food; the livelihood of a people depends 
on land”), and “Toitu he whenua, whatungarongaro he tangata” (“The land remains after the 
people have gone”).2 Paerau Warbrick has commented that to Māori the “whenua … is linked 
with people and the greater cosmos, and incorporates the corporeal as well as the ethereal.”3 
Unsurprisingly, claims to land have been a central part of the New Zealand Treaty settlement 
process.  
Within the framework of the importance of land to Māori, the return of land was a key 
component in Waikato-Tainui’s raupatu (confiscation) Treaty settlement (1989-1995) that is 
embodied in the principle that governed their negotiations for decades: “I riro whenua atu me 
hoki whenua mai”—as land was taken so land must be returned. For Waikato-Tainui the 
confiscation of their lands was a vivid symbol of the way in which their mana whenua or 
authority over land was directly challenged. This article argues, much like Michael J. Stevens 
does in relation to the Ngāi Tahu settlement, that the negotiations regarding the return of land 
to Waikato-Tainui represented a situation under which the Crown’s power was reinvented 
rather than weakened.4 Compromises were made and some land was returned but it was under 
the Crown’s framework and overall control.  
The return of land was marked by Waikato-Tainui’s efforts to ensure the land could not 
be alienated again in the future. In 1991 and 1993 two former military bases at Hopuhopu and 
Te Rapa were slated for return to Waikato-Tainui. Although Waikato-Tainui occupied both 
bases earlier, they were not legally transferred until settlement legislation was passed in 1995.5 
Waikato-Tainui sought legal mechanisms to retain returned land such as the restoration of land 
under a form of inalienable customary title rather than fee simple title. Waikato-Tainui also 
sought the return of lands without marginal strips.6 Waikato-Tainui’s settlement was ultimately 
restricted to grievances solely regarding the confiscation of land and was not marked by the 
environmental management issues that at times dominated nearly all other negotiations since 
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they were the first iwi-based negotiation to complete a settlement. Nonetheless Waikato-Tainui 
attempted to have Department of Conservation (DoC) land included in its settlement, or at least 
a co-management role with DoC for the land in the Waikato-Tainui rohe, but there was similar 
opposition both within and outside government from conservation interests. In addition to 
conservationists, Waikato-Tainui also had to contend with other third-parties—former owners 
of Crown land taken under the Public Works Act—who delayed the return of Crown land in 
the Waikato-Tainui settlement, but that is an issue of some complexity that will have to be 
addressed in detail elsewhere. This article will analyse the negotiations regarding the return of 
specific lands at Hopuhopu and Te Rapa as well as Department of Conservation lands, the 
establishment of Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank, and the legal form in which land would be 
returned. Although the Crown had overwhelming control of the wider process, Waikato-Tainui 
were able to regain some lands and enhance in some ways their rangatiratanga or self-
determination. 
 
The context of the negotiations 
Waikato-Tainui sought to halt the alienation of Crown lands in its tribal region in the wake of 
the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. In the NZMC v. Attorney-General case the New Zealand 
Māori Council charged that the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 breached the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi because the Act enabled the government to privatise land and assets, 
which would then become unavailable for use as compensation for Māori historical grievances. 
Sir Robin Cooke and his fellow justices in the Court of Appeal agreed that the legislation did 
breach the principles of the Treaty and forced the government to negotiate with Māori leaders 
to develop some safeguards that would protect land and assets from sale.7 The result was the 
Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 which provided clawback mechanisms, called 
memorials, for land and assets that were subject to Māori claims, but their effectiveness in 
halting the alienation of land was in no way immediate.8 
During Waikato-Tainui’s scoping negotiations in mid-1989, Crown officials were 
informed by Waikato-Tainui negotiators that the continuing alienation of Crown land was a 
primary concern. The Treasury official involved in the scoping negotiations attempted to 
develop a system under which Waikato-Tainui would receive a warning regarding the pending 
alienation of Crown land and potentially halt the sale. If Waikato-Tainui sought the inclusion 
of the Crown land in their settlement, it would be placed in a land-bank for future use. 
Unfortunately there was no support for such a system for Waikato-Tainui from senior Crown 
officials although it is unclear what the specific rationales were. Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank 
was not established until early 1993. Although the land-banking process was an innovative 
method to protect against the alienation of Crown land, the nature of the process could be 
frustrating for Waikato-Tainui as there were limits to the amount of land and types of land 
allowed in each land-bank. Damian Stone has rightly commented that Crown properties 
available for land-banking often consisted of the least profitable and hence least desirable 
Crown lands available.9 In addition, as Alan Ward has noted, it was “not easy for claimants to 
discern, from the information provided, what was important land” in terms of its potential 
profitability.10 Since Waikato-Tainui wanted all land returned there were tensions around 
identifying which specific lands would be returned. At times, less profitable lands such as urupa 
may have been sought. Many of the issues surrounding the development and operation of 
Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank emerged from the Crown’s overriding control of the land-banking 
process in setting the kind of lands that would be available and the total cap on each land-bank.  
 
Methodology 
Research for this article was enabled by the Office of Treaty Settlements (referred to as OTS 
in the references) in Wellington, which provided access to its archives. These sources were 
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supplemented by the collections held by the Waikato-Tainui College of Research and 
Development located at Hopuhopu near Ngaruawahia. In addition, Sir Douglas Graham, the 
Minister of Treaty Negotiations for most of the 1990s, provided unrestricted access to his own 
personal files held at Archives New Zealand (Archives NZ), Wellington. As a historian 
employed by neither the Crown nor Waikato-Tainui, I have used all the material available to 
me.  
Throughout the research nearly all Crown officials are unidentified. Officials do what 
their job description requires them to do—give advice to the Minister and the government and 
once decisions are made by Cabinet, implement those decisions. Any letter, memorandum or 
paper that was signed out to the Minister went through many hands and had managerial input 
and reflected an institutional view not the personal views of the authors, which is one of the 
reasons that almost all Crown officials have remained anonymous. Ministers, Secretaries of 
Ministries, principal negotiators and Waikato-Tainui advisors (where they have agreed to be 
named) have not been kept anonymous.  Generally, documents were split into approximately 
four different formats: memoranda, briefing and Cabinet papers, correspondence, and minutes 
of meetings. These primary sources were supplemented by contemporary newspapers such as 
the Evening Post, Waikato Times, New Zealand Herald, the Dominion and The Press, and 
periodicals such as The Listener and North and South.  
For the official monthly meetings, minutes were produced by both the Crown and the 
respective claimant negotiating group. These were subject to revisions from both sides and an 
agreed set of minutes were produced for each meeting. This set of minutes was the Crown’s 
official record of the meeting. Waikato-Tainui also produced their own record of the minutes 
of the meeting. These were not subject to revision by the Crown and were often not shared with 
the Crown unless there was a substantial disagreement over a negotiation issue or over the 
accuracy of the Crown’s version of the meeting. The Crown’s minutes of meetings were always 
shorter than either of Waikato-Tainui’s versions of the meetings. Sometimes the Crown could 
use just one page to provide minutes for the meeting whereas Waikato-Tainui could use up to 
ten pages for the exact same meeting. 
At individual meetings between Graham and Waikato-Tainui Principal Negotiator 
Robert Mahuta there would be no record of the meeting from the Crown or from Graham 
himself. Graham’s archive was a much more official collection that consisted of barely any of 
the filenotes that Mahuta kept. Mahuta kept copious notes of phone calls and meetings. One of 
Mahuta’s advisors, Shane Solomon, was a prolific notetaker and cartoonist. Their archives 
provide a singular view of certain meetings because there was no evidence of the meeting from 
the Crown archive. The singular point of view provided by such a perspective could potentially 
influence the value of the source since the only information had come from that one source, 
but the same concern could apply to the perspectives of Crown officials.  
In general, larger meetings would have more sources of information and could be 
corroborated in better ways. Sometimes there would be numerous different accounts of one 
large meeting from both the Crown and Waikato-Tainui. This would not often be the case as 
the best case scenario was at least one version from the Crown and one from Waikato-Tainui. 
Much larger meetings that involved public consultation would have publications such as 
newspapers producing their own accounts as well as video accounts of the signing. These types 
of meetings provided the best circumstances for the proliferation of sources. The changes that 
could be made to meeting minutes were generally a result of compromise but at least one of 
the early minutes in the Waikato-Tainui negotiations was altered unilaterally. When Labour 
Minister of Justice Bill Jeffries was involved in the negotiations in 1990, the Crown’s own 
copy of the March meeting minutes has written on the first page that “these were altered by the 
Minister [Jeffries].”11 It was unclear exactly which alterations had been made but luckily for 
that specific meeting there was also a Waikato-Tainui version of the meeting.  
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The return of Hopuhopu, Te Rapa and hapū dissent 
Although negotiations had begun with the Fourth Labour Government in 1989, the substantive 
phase did not begin until the negotiations with the Fourth National Government in late 1991. 
Without any detailed Treaty policy the government was often accused by Waikato-Tainui of 
purposefully delaying the negotiations. The Crown for its part believed that it was responding 
to arguments from Waikato-Tainui without any preconceived notions. Although the Crown 
was generally opposed to interim settlements, it was forced to placate Waikato-Tainui with 
various mechanisms such as offering the return of land from late 1991 onwards as a gift and 
gesture of goodwill. Before the two parties formally met, the Crown informed Waikato-Tainui 
that the decommissioned Hopuhopu Army Base was available for transfer to the iwi to meet 
Waikato-Tainui’s principle that as land was taken so land must be returned (“i riro whenua atu 
me hoki whenua mai”).12  
At first, Waikato-Tainui were stunned that the Crown was actually returning land and did 
not believe Minister of Treaty Negotiations Douglas Graham when he made the announcement 
at Whaataapaka marae in late 1991.13 Although the return of the base initially engendered some 
substantial good will between the two parties, eventually the significant financial liabilities that 
the base carried eroded some of that good will.14 These financial liabilities resulted from the 
dilapidated state of the houses and buildings located on the land, the removal of items as basic 
as the kitchen sinks in all houses and buildings, and the contamination of land and buildings 
from old ammunition stocks. When Waikato-Tainui advisors complained to the Crown about 
the excessive costs of the due diligence the iwi had conducted prior to occupation of the sites, 
Crown officials meekly replied that no promises had ever been made about the state in which 
land and improvements would be returned, only that they would be transferred.15  
Heta Tarawhiti of Waikato-Tainui hapū Ngāti Whawhakia had originally gifted the land 
at Hopuhopu to the Anglican Church in 1853 for educational purposes. The area was initially 
used to build a Church and school that local Māori children attended. Once the wars of the 
1860s developed, the area was abandoned.16 The Anglican Church retained ownership until it 
was taken under the Public Works Act during World War II. When Waikato-Tainui began 
expressing an interest in having Hopuhopu returned to the iwi in the late 1980s, the Anglican 
Church supported their endeavour. The opposition to the return of Hopuhopu to the Tainui 
Māori Trust Board (TMTB) was from two separate parties. The descendants of Heta Tarawhiti 
sought the return of the land to the original owners’ descendants. The other opponents of the 
return were conservative elements in the National Party as well as in society in general. The 
Chairman of the Rotoiti branch of the National Party, Ross Baker, wrote to Prime Minister Jim 
Bolger demanding an explanation as to “why the Minister of Justice is giving the Hopuhopu 
military camp to the Tainui people?” Baker believed that Waikato-Tainui had rebelled in the 
1860s and deserved punishment. In addition he pointed to the “full and final” settlement of 
1946.17 A similar complaint was made in a letter to the Waikato Times regarding the return of 
Hopuhopu and in a letter to Doug Graham. Bolger replied to Baker that Waikato-Tainui’s 
claims were valid and the return of Hopuhopu was an appropriate step to take in commencing 
negotiations.18  
Mahuta wrote in a memorandum sometime in the middle of 1991 that the question of 
who or what the land would be vested in remained to be decided by the TMTB, with the input 
of the wider Waikato-Tainui community. Did they want the land in freehold fee simple title or 
under Māori Land title? What were the implications for any future development at Hopuhopu? 
Who would they register as the owner of Hopuhopu: “[The] Trust Board, Ngā Marae Toopu, 
[the] descendants of the original owners, Te Wherowhero?”19 Mahuta was going to seek a 
kaumatua hui to seek direction on these points. Mahuta’s opinion on the issue of alienability 
was influenced by the research conducted at the Centre for Maaori Studies and Research 
(CMSR) at the University of Waikato of which he was the Director. Investigations of 
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international experiences of Treaty settlement processes in Alaska, Canada and the United 
States strongly influenced his desire for inalienable title. The for-profit corporations established 
after the 1971 settlement with Alaskan indigenous groups was an especially strong influence 
on his thoughts as not only had a number of academics based in Alaska such as Nicholas 
Flanders been research fellows at the CMSR, but Mahuta had also spent a semester teaching at 
the University of Alaska in 1985.20 Later, when Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (ToWPU) 
officials asked Waikato-Tainui negotiators how people would receive benefits, Mahuta 
responded there would be a list of beneficiaries and that it would be up to individuals to make 
a choice of which of the 33 hapū they associated with. Mahuta hoped that it would “shake 
people out of their apathy” and emphasised later in a meeting with Crown officials that “as we 
suffered collectively so we should benefit collectively.”21 
It was ultimately decided by TMTB that Hopuhopu (and later Te Rapa) would be vested 
in Te Wherowhero, the first leader of the Kīngitanga, to ensure that it could not be alienated. 
This stemmed from the previous historical experience of various Waikato-Tainui hapū who 
had portions of confiscated land returned by the Compensation Court. Under the jurisdiction 
of the Court, rather than return the land into tribal ownership, lands were returned to individuals 
who could sell their lands without hindrance. Most of the lands that were eventually returned 
to King Pōtatau following the opening of the King Country were gradually sold by individuals 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Chief Waikato-Tainui negotiator Robert 
Mahuta commented in a letter to his senior legal advisor Denese Henare: “This is what we are 
trying to stop by vesting the land in Te Wherowhero and then appointing custodial trustees to 
ensure that the land is never able to be alienated as it was previously.”22 The desire by Waikato-
Tainui negotiators to vest settlement assets into a collective structure reflected the aspirations 
of Waikato-Tainui to re-assert their rangatiratanga. The decision was made following 
consultation with the TMTB and Ngā Marae Toopu, a collective of marae affiliated with the 
Kingitanga.  
Waikato-Tainui negotiators wanted special legislation used to specifically vest 
Hopuhopu in Te Wherowhero because they were concerned that a vesting of land in an ancestor 
under the Māori Affairs Act 1953 was not possible. The CLO did not want to use special 
legislation and pressed for a vesting under the Māori Affairs Act. In November 1992 the 
Minister of Lands made an application to the Māori Land Court to vest Hopuhopu in Te 
Wherowhero. In December 1992 the Māori Land Court under Section 437 of the Māori Affairs 
Act vested Hopuhopu in Te Wherowhero and the TMTB as “trustee for the benefit of the 
Waikato Tainui tribes” until a separate Trust had been established to own and manage the 
land.23  
Despite the orders made by the Māori Land Court in late 1992 regarding the assets 
received from the Crown, the vesting of Hopuhopu was still being debated within Waikato-
Tainui in mid-1993. By then the Crown had also offered to transfer to Waikato-Tainui the Te 
Rapa Air Base outside of Hamilton.24 The Te Rapa land had previously been owned by the 
Livingstone Family, and they were offered back the land according to the Public Works Act in 
mid-1992.25 Initially there were concerns expressed to ToWPU officials that a private 
developer would purchase the land from the Livingstone Family.26 In October 1992 a DoSLI 
official wrote to ToWPU that the Livingstone Family declined to purchase the Te Rapa airbase 
and that it would be purchased for immediate transfer to Waikato-Tainui as a partial settlement 
of its claims.27 Nonetheless in August 1993 a ToWPU official stated in a memorandum that the 
Tainui Māori Trust Board (with Crown funding) had purchased the land from the Livingstone 
Family.28 It is unclear how those negotiations took place and who precisely was involved but 
it presumably included representatives from ToWPU, the Tainui Māori Trust Board and the 
Livingstone Family.  
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Two hapū, Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere, argued that since the Hopuhopu and Te 
Rapa military bases were located in their communities the land should be directly vested in 
them. Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere took their case to the Māori Appellate Court to 
attempt to halt the vesting of the land but their appeal was rejected. In 1993 the Court stated 
that “we accept that the Crown’s intention was to return the lands as part settlement of the 
Tainui raupatu lands claim” and that “the settlement was with Tainui and not any individual 
hapū.”29 The Court’s decision reflected the government’s preference for negotiating with larger 
groupings such as iwi rather than hapū, although the return of the settlement assets to hapū in 
theory may have been the best solution to effect rangatiratanga.30 Although the Māori Appellate 
Court approved the return of Hopuhopu to the iwi, it did not expressly approve of the use of 
the Māori Affairs Act to vest the Hopuhopu lands and the matter would remain unsettled until 
settlement legislation was passed in October 1995. Legislation was necessary to formally 
underline the transfer of land due to the limits of vesting lands into a deceased ancestor.31 
Waikato-Tainui advisor John Te Maru was optimistic that during the two previous years of 
“intense tribal debate” Waikato had reached the consensus that returned land should be vested 
in Te Wherowhero to ensure that the properties could never be alienated.32 Mahuta informed 
the Crown that the delays in reaching a settlement had severely corroded the robustness of the 
TMTB’s mandate alluding to the challenges in the Māori Appellate Court from Ngāti 
Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere dissidents.33 
 
The gradual development and eventual establishment of Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank 
Outside of Hopuhopu and Te Rapa there were no further lands transferred to Waikato-Tainui 
during their negotiations. The development of Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank was thus integral 
to maintaining the Crown’s asset base in the tribal rohe. During Waikato-Tainui’s scoping 
negotiations with the Fourth Labour Government in July and August 1989, a Treasury official 
drafted a Cabinet paper that proposed to establish the first land-bank.  The Treasury official 
suggested a system under which the TMTB would be warned when the alienation of Crown 
land in the Waikato-Tainui rohe was proposed. The Trust Board would then have the 
opportunity to place the property in their land-bank for future use in a settlement. The draft 
Cabinet paper developed by the Treasury official was never finalised and sent to Cabinet.34 The 
litigation undertaken by the TMTB with regards to coal assets in their rohe in late August 1989, 
the “Coalcorp case,” effectively caused a brief delay in negotiations.35 Presumably, the delay 
was the reason the land-bank was not developed any further in the early scoping negotiations.36  
After the TMTB’s victory in the Coalcorp case, Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations with the 
Crown continued in March 1990 with Robert Mahuta and Justice Minister Bill Jeffries as 
respective lead negotiators. The continuing alienation of Crown land in the Waikato-Tainui 
rohe remained a significant concern for Waikato-Tainui negotiators. In a May 1990 report to 
the Core Group of Officials in the Crown Task Force on Treaty of Waitangi Issues, ToWPU 
officials stated that “restraint [in the alienation of Crown land] was considered necessary to 
comply with the view of the Court of Appeal in the Coalcorp case that any attempt to shut out 
in advance claims to surplus lands is not consistent with Treaty principles.” After the 
establishment of Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank in early 1990, ToWPU officials pressed Cabinet to put 
the land-bank system in place for Ngāi Tahu to the TMTB. ToWPU officials believed that the 
continuing alienation of Crown land had the potential to jeopardise the negotiations and 
potentially push Waikato-Tainui to re-initiate litigation to prevent the alienation of further 
Crown land. At the very least, the establishment of a land-bank would be construed as a gesture 
of goodwill from the Crown.37 Despite the recommendations of ToWPU, Cabinet refused to 
establish the land-bank and instead focused on developing the settlement offer that was rejected 
by Waikato-Tainui later in 1990.38  
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In the absence of any system by 1991, Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors turned 
to asking for written undertakings from the new National Minister of SOEs Doug Kidd and 
Minister of Justice Doug Graham that Crown assets should not be sold in the Waikato raupatu 
rohe. Before negotiations formally began with National, Waikato-Tainui’s legal advisor, 
Denese Henare, wrote repeatedly to warn Graham and the ToWPU Director about Crown 
properties that were offered for sale.39 While claimants should have been expending their time 
and energy on the task of negotiation, often Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors were 
forced to use their limited resources ensuring that the Crown’s asset base was not diminished 
any further.  
Graham sought to institute a land-bank system for Waikato-Tainui and other large 
claimant groups such as Muriwhenua and Taranaki. Formal negotiations had recommenced 
between the Crown and Waikato-Tainui negotiators in November 1991 and by mid-1992 
ToWPU officials began to develop Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank. While Waikato-Tainui 
appreciated the efforts being made by the Crown to develop a land-bank, the proposal still 
contained a presumption of sale which was not appropriate for Waikato-Tainui’s land for land 
principle that all lands should be returned.40  
Waikato-Tainui argued that the Crown should provide a diverse set of assets. Waikato-
Tainui wanted to include Crown Research Institute (CRI) land, Housing New Zealand (HNZ) 
properties, Area Health Boards and educational properties. In addition to the ability to include 
these lands in their land-bank, Waikato-Tainui requested that the Crown maintain its stock of 
HNZ properties in the rohe until negotiations were complete.41 Treasury did not agree that HNZ 
or Area Health Boards were Crown assets and was especially concerned about how the 
precedent of no net diminution would affect HNZ’s commercial operations. How would HNZ 
follow their directives which instructed them to sell all surplus lands? As a result of the small 
size of the Waikato-Tainui rohe, ToWPU officials also proposed that there be no cap on the 
Waikato-Tainui land-bank but Treasury maintained that it was necessary for claimants to 
understand that the Crown’s funds were not limitless. Treasury’s final concern was that the 
Crown would be held financially responsible for deferred maintenance. Despite the negative 
experience of Waikato-Tainui with Hopuhopu, Treasury decided that claimants would have to 
receive the properties as is. In reaction to Treasury opposition, a ToWPU official responded 
that Waikato-Tainui “would have to have some kind of land-bank at some point.” Treasury 
replied that it wanted a separate Treasury comment in the land-bank paper, which aided in its 
eventual rejection in Cabinet in mid-1992.42 
After ToWPU’s failed attempts at establishing a land-bank for Waikato-Tainui in 1992, 
Graham sought to re-engage with Treasury, Cabinet and Waikato-Tainui over the issue in early 
1993. Graham wrote to Mahuta to discuss what the cap for the Waikato-Tainui land-bank might 
be. Although any engagement was welcomed while the negotiations were essentially in hiatus, 
legal advisor Denese Henare wrote to Mahuta expressing her concern about Graham’s request 
for a discussion regarding the cap for the land-bank. Although the development of the land-
bank was welcomed by the Waikato-Tainui negotiators, Henare interpreted the development 
as the Crown approaching the issue “piece-meal.” To Henare the land-bank was merely an 
instrument for preserving the Crown’s capacity to provide reparations, not a part of the final 
settlement arrangement although it is unclear exactly what the difference is. At this point the 
Right of First Refusal (which provided Waikato-Tainui the right to be the first to purchase 
Crown lands as they were privatised) had yet to be developed, so Henare was not correct in the 
long term but in the short term her frustration stemmed from the Crown’s insistence on a cap 
for the land-bank.43 “The Waikato position is that we will have all you have got put into the 
land bank, which is effectively the 163,000 acres of properties within the Crown dossier.” 
There were also some significant concerns about receiving the lands on an “as is, where is” 
basis, especially as a result of the TMTB’s negative experience with Hopuhopu. The good will 
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established by the return of Hopuhopu had been tainted by the significant financial liabilities 
that the base carried upon transfer. Henare recommended that Mahuta discuss it privately with 
the Minister rather than a potentially “provocative letter” to ensure Graham was kept on side.44  
ToWPU recommended to Cabinet that the cap for the Waikato-Tainui land-bank be set 
at $35 million while Treasury advocated that it should be set at $16 million to ensure funding 
was also made available for other Treaty claim settlements and land-banks. Unusually, ToWPU 
won out in the end. In contrast to Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank, the properties also would have to be 
the first used in any future settlement. While it was clear that Waikato-Tainui wanted all of the 
Crown’s remaining land placed in the land-bank, Mahuta nonetheless wrote a thankful letter to 
the Crown. In early May 1993 Graham replied that he was happy to inform Mahuta that the 
land-bank was formerly established and had a $35 million cap, with one minor rider that was 
symbolic of the gulf between the power of each party in the negotiation: “The Crown reserves 
the right to cancel the land bank and free the properties for sale.”45 
One of the first assets available for Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank were 200 Electricity 
Corporation New Zealand (ECNZ) houses located in Meremere and Huntly. These ECNZ 
properties had protection memorials on their title.46 Waikato-Tainui advisors cautioned ECNZ 
that they should not proceed with the auction to sell the properties but ECNZ did not heed their 
warnings. After receiving no bids ECNZ offered the properties to the Crown for inclusion in 
the Waikato-Tainui land-bank.47 The land-banking of the ECNZ surplus assets was supported 
by Treasury but only because of the advanced nature of Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations with 
the Crown. Some officials from Treasury attempted to argue that because the bulk purchase 
had resulted in the Crown purchasing at half the value, the Crown should receive some kind of 
compensation. ToWPU officials were clearly unimpressed by the idea:  
Such an approach is inconsistent with the principles for land banking and with the 
proposed operation of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund. The cap on the land 
bank provides incentives for the claimants to select properties up to its value on the 
basis of the sum of the prices paid for those properties. Claimants carry the risk that 
the properties will reduce in value while in the land bank. The Crown loses nothing if 
the properties increase in value. We consider to impose a charge against the cap on 
the land bank of any more than the price paid by the Crown would be an act of bad 
faith.48  
 
ToWPU officials obviously felt strongly about the issue and successfully countered Treasury. 
Once the land-bank was established the TMTB slowly evaluated surplus Crown 
properties for inclusion in the land-bank. Graham complained in a letter to Mahuta regarding 
the delays in evaluating properties. Mahuta responded that the Crown had provided incomplete 
information with regards to the extent of the Crown’s asset base in the Waikato-Tainui rohe. 
In June 1993 the Crown enquired whether Waikato-Tainui sought to add certain properties into 
the land-bank. Mahuta wrote a frustrated reply to ToWPU officials: 
Given the current state of confusion, maybe all housing stock should go into the Land-
bank before we are pestered to make decisions based on scanty information.... As you 
can see from the tenor of this note, I came out of my meeting with the Minister feeling 
somewhat annoyed that matters have not really progressed very far. If the Crown has 
no intention to settle with Waikato then perhaps that needs to be said so that we can 
all reassess our positions. We are incurring too much time, energy and costs on non-
fruitful endeavours.49 
 
In 1994 Mahuta continued this argument and emphasised the Crown’s lack of funding for 
evaluating surplus properties for land-banking which had inhibited the TMTB’s other 
operations. Mahuta added that it was “important from the TMTB’s perspective (and in the 
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longer term that of the Crown) to ensure it is assets rather than liabilities which are being land-
banked. The Hopuhopu and Te Rapa experiences are a constant reminder of this. Accordingly, 
prudence suggests that the Board must and will continue to be careful in its scrutiny of 
properties to be transferred.”50 Mahuta noted that without any type of agreement on the 
implementation of the settlement the “exercise has something of the ring of shuffling paper 
from one government department to another.” Mahuta stated that it was important to Waikato-
Tainui, and from Mahuta’s point of view also for the Crown, that properties with liabilities not 
be used in the settlement. This would simply represent a repetition of history similar to the 
return of lands by the Compensation Court in the nineteenth century after the original 
confiscation of land when mainly unusable land was returned.51 
As the Crown continued to raise concerns with the delays in Waikato-Tainui’s evaluation 
of properties, Mahuta continued to express his concern with the quality of Crown properties 
offered for inclusion. Graham stressed that Waikato-Tainui did not have to approve each and 
every property. Henare pointed out that Waikato-Tainui’s concerns with Graham’s 
recommendation was the potential for an unsuccessful negotiation in which Waikato-Tainui 
acquiesces to the disposal of land. Graham countered that it was not only surplus properties 
which could be used in any settlement, but any properties in the Crown’s dossier. This changed 
the situation as it was different from anything discussed previously. Mahuta took this point one 
step further and asked whether non-Crown lands would be available for purchase with 
settlement funds, which Graham confirmed. This was necessary because of the significant 
liabilities which most properties in the Crown dossier carried. 52  
The return of land was a central component in the Waikato-Tainui negotiation process. 
While some Crown lands were offered for return, lands from the DoC estate were excluded. 
Waikato-Tainui was focused on not only the return of land, but also ensuring the land that was 
transferred could be retained. Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors advocated for the return 
of land under customary title, rather than the fee simple title that was proposed, and also sought 
the return of lands that were not subject to marginal strips. Waikato-Tainui were concerned 
that their land settlement would not affect their claims to the Waikato River and West Coast 
Harbours that had been separated early in the negotiations. These issues reflected Waikato-
Tainui’s overriding concerns with the return and retention of land under circumstances that 
would enhance the rangatiratanga of the iwi in the Waikato.  
 
Waikato-Tainui and the return of DoC land 
DoC’s involvement in the Waikato-Tainui negotiations was limited since the settlement would 
only address issues regarding the confiscation of land, rather than specific conservation sites. 
Nonetheless, Waikato-Tainui sought land from the conservation estate or, if the return of DoC 
land was not possible, then a co-management role in DoC areas.53 There was just over 55,000 
acres of DoC lands in the Waikato raupatu rohe.54 Late in the negotiations Mahuta attempted 
to have full title to the DoC estate included in the settlement. Those DoC lands would then be 
leased back to the Crown at peppercorn rentals which would be reviewed every 25 years. 
Mahuta stated in a letter to Graham: “It is not the intention to develop Conservation lands. We 
are however, interested in joint management of the estate and the jobs or training opportunities 
that might arise. Such an arrangement would satisfy our ‘Land for Land’ principle while at the 
same time meet the Crown’s desire to maintain the lands for public use and access.” Waikato-
Tainui negotiators stressed that international examples of co-management regimes in Australia 
and Canada had provided precedents and would be valuable to use in the New Zealand 
context.55 Furthermore, Waikato-Tainui condemned the Crown’s own record of conservation 
and alluded to the poor job it had done in the Waikato region to that date. Waikato-Tainui 
stressed that the iwi would work with involved stakeholders such as conservation boards and 
regional and local authorities and would strive to enhance the conservation value of the lands 
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as well as the public’s access to them.56 Graham stated that the conservation estate was not 
available and instead offered Waikato-Tainui representation on the Waikato Conservation 
Board.57 The issue of the DoC estate was consistently brought up during the consultation 
process by both supporters and opponents of Mahuta within Waikato-Tainui. It was a very 
important issue for the iwi that could have derailed the settlement because Waikato-Tainui 
wanted an increased kaitiaki role in the overall management of the DoC estate.58 
The DoC position was very firm although it was challenged by ToWPU. The lead 
ToWPU official on the Waikato-Tainui negotiations tried to work with DoC, but they 
maintained their opposition. The Director-General of DoC replied to ToWPU inquiries 
regarding the use of the conservation estate in either the transfer of land or co-management,  
that there were significant and wide ranging implications if any of the conservation estate was 
transferred to Waikato-Tainui, even if DoC lands were immediately gifted back. The Director-
General referred to the difficulties involved in the return of Mount Hikurangi to Ngāti Porou. 
Issues regarding public access to Mount Hikurangi following its return to Ngāti Porou made 
the Director-General apprehensive. He pointed to the spectre of co-management with Māori 
claimants and questioned whether the Crown or public was ready for such a change. He also 
referred to the potential negative effect on “investment security for businesses.”59 DoC’s 
position in Cabinet prevailed, and there was no involvement from DoC in Waikato-Tainui’s 
settlement.60 
At the time there was no policy on the return of conservation lands since the 1989 
Principles on Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi consisted of general directives rather 
than specific policy positions and the 1990 booklet produced by the Treaty of Waitangi Policy, 
The Direct Negotiation of Māori Claims, had nothing specific on conservation either. But the 
Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims were under development 
during the Waikato-Tainui negotiations and were released two weeks before the Heads of 
Agreement was signed on 21 December 1994. The 1994 Crown Proposals provided for the 
return of specific and discrete conservation lands that claimants could prove had cultural 
significance. A year and a half later when Ngāi Tahu signed their Heads of Agreement just 
over 500 acres of DoC lands around the South Island were returned as a part of the Ngāi Tahu 
settlement. The use of DoC lands in Treaty settlements have particularly increased since 2008 
and the direction of policy under Minister of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations Christopher 
Finlayson.61 
 
Waikato-Tainui’s desire for customary title  
The legal form in which lands would be returned also troubled Waikato-Tainui negotiators and 
advisors. Legal advisor Denese Henare felt that special legislation specifically vesting returned 
land into Waikato-Tainui was necessary. When the parties were approaching a Heads of 
Agreement in late 1994 and it became apparent that further lands in addition to Hopuhopu and 
Te Rapa would be transferred, Henare again pressed for special arrangements to govern the 
return of land to Waikato-Tainui.  Henare corresponded with ToWPU officials about the 
possibility of the return of land under customary title that would not be governed by the 
provisions of the Public Works Act. Henare feared that Waikato-Tainui would not have 
absolute control over its land if it was subject to possible future confiscation of land through 
administrative means such as public works takings. ToWPU officials had raised the issue of 
customary title with Graham but he did not believe the concept could be used. Graham repeated 
his opposition publically at a February 1995 academic conference on Treaty settlements held 
in Wellington. Henare had wanted to engage in formulating relationships between 
rangatiratanga and the statutory and regulatory powers of central and local government, but the 
traditional aversion by the New Zealand government to any delegation of sovereignty was 
paramount.62 
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Although Graham had rejected the suggestion of placing the land being returned to 
Waikato-Tainui in a form of tribal or customary title, Henare and Waikato-Tainui junior legal 
advisor Shane Solomon still sought ways to instil into the proposed legislation the special spirit 
and intent of this particular transfer of land from the Crown. Solomon looked to the 
developments in Australia with regards to native title at both the federal and state levels for 
inspiration but admitted that the Crown would probably oppose such proposals. In terms of 
conservation land Waikato-Tainui negotiators had fought for the Australian “Uluru” model, 
but the Crown rejected the model.63 The Crown offered a reserved position on the Waikato 
Conservation Board.  Solomon wanted the legislation that governed the returned land to reflect 
the tenure of the land as it was in 1863—something Solomon admitted was very difficult: 
What is being sought there is the nature of the “ownership” back in 1863-65. There 
should be no confusion that we are seeking the lands to be returned in the state they 
were in back then - ie the University lands to be returned with no improvements. The 
“ownership” issue relates to the vesting of the lands under the Kingiitanga, thus the 
compulsory taking of those lands by the Crown. It also relates to the tribal interest in 
the lands. Prior to the wars and confiscations, lands vested in Te Wherowhero 
(subsequently reaffirmed through the years). The Confiscations removed lands away 
from both the kingiitanga [sic] and therefore the Tribe. Today, the return of the lands 
must benefit all of the tribe who suffered, not just those who are fortunate enough to 
have Crown owned lands left to settle the grievance. The vast majority are not so 
fortunate.64 
 
The debates over the form in which land would be returned and to which organisation the land 
would be returned remained pressing throughout the negotiation process. During a February 
1995 meeting with Waikato-Tainui advisors, Crown officials expressed their concern that if 
certain lands were rendered inalienable, it would affect the iwi’s commercial flexibility 
following settlement. Waikato-Tainui financial advisors countered that although it would not 
be possible to mortgage inalienable land, the income from valuable leases could still be 
mortgaged. Waikato-Tainui advisors stated that the inalienable status of the land provided 
comfort to the people that the returned lands would remain in the ownership of the iwi.65 
Mahuta also discussed the issue of a special title over lands returned with Graham directly 
during the period of negotiations between the signing of the Heads of Agreement in December 
1994 and the Deed of Settlement in May 1995. After consideration by Graham, he maintained 
that land could be put into Te Wherowhero title as Hopuhopu and Te Rapa were, but that the 
land would still be in fee simple title, not any kind of “customary” title. Mahuta also was 
concerned about other land issues—the imposition by the Crown of marginal strips, and the 
desire by Waikato-Tainui to maintain the protective Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 
1988 memorials on land along the Waikato River.66  
 
Marginal strips 
Waikato-Tainui’s concerns with the manner in which land was returned led to Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators expressing their reservation with the return of land accompanied by marginal strips. 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators viewed marginal strips as another form of confiscation. The Crown 
was adamant that marginal strips would remain adjacent to former SOE lands along the river 
and foreshore, even after the protection memorials were lifted and the land possibly transferred 
to Waikato-Tainui. OTS explained to Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Denese Henare that when 
the lands were first transferred to a SOE a marginal strip was imposed. The marginal strip 
would remain even after the land was disposed of privately by the SOE or via transfer to 
Waikato-Tainui in any Treaty settlement. OTS stated that for other non-SOE lands the Crown 
still retained the right to create a marginal strip whenever it disposed of land: “[M]arginal strips 
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will be imposed, where relevant, when the Crown transfers land to [Waikato-]Tainui under the 
settlement.”67  
The Waikato-Tainui opposition to marginal strips was so strong that the Deed of 
Settlement noted Waikato-Tainui’s concerns. The Crown would maintain its power to retain 
and create marginal strips, but it agreed to record Waikato-Tainui’s dissent. Section 5.4.3 of 
the Deed of Settlement stated: “That the Crown recognises that the issue of the creation of 
marginal strips on land to be transferred to the Land Holding Trustee is of serious concern to 
Waikato.” The settlement clause noted further that “the Crown acknowledges that Waikato 
intend to advance their concerns about the creation of marginal strips to the Minister of 
Conservation.”68  Waikato-Tainui continued to express their opposition to the imposition and 
retention of marginal strips during the Māori Affairs Select Committee Hearings before 
legislation was passed in November 1995.69 Waikato-Tainui were unsuccessful in advancing 
their concerns about the creation of marginal strips with the Minister of Conservation, and the 
issue would remain to be negotiated in Waikato-Tainui’s Waikato River Treaty Settlement.70  
 
The removal of protection memorials on SOE lands along the Waikato River 
Another concern regarding the return of land for Waikato-Tainui negotiators was the separation 
of their land claim from Waikato-Tainui claims to the Waikato River and the three West Coast 
Harbours: Aotea, Kawhia and Whaingaroa (Raglan).71 The River especially had been discussed 
at various times throughout the negotiation in the early 1990s but by 1994 it was clear that the 
River and the Harbours would be dealt with separately to facilitate an earlier settlement of the 
raupatu claim. It is unclear if Waikato-Tainui would have preferred to have all its claims settled 
at once if that realistically been a choice. Some settlements in more recent times that 
encompassed major water bodies have involved the separation of those claims from land-based 
claims such as the various iwi settlements for the Waikato, Waipa and Whanganui Rivers and 
the Te Arawa Lakes.72 The Crown wanted to have the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) 
Act 1988 protection memorials removed from State Owned Enterprises (SOE) lands along the 
Waikato River.73 Waikato-Tainui were concerned that their claim to the Waikato River was 
unjustly being affected by their land claim. Waikato-Tainui stated that retaining the memorials 
on river-side SOE properties was integral to the river and harbours claim, but the Crown 
contended that the memorials would be removed from the titles of SOE lands along the river 
by their land settlement. Waikato-Tainui felt that the rangatiratanga of their river and harbours 
claim was being challanged by the Crown.74 Late in the negotiation process, only weeks before 
the signing of the Deed of Settlement, Mahuta requested that the memorials remain on the SOE 
properties along the Waikato River but Graham refused. Despite Waikato-Tainui’s objections, 
Graham stated that the memorials would be removed from the SOE properties along the river.75 
The Crown’s position on the memorials for the river-side SOE properties led to further 
Waikato-Tainui concerns about their continuing Treaty of Waitangi rights to the river and 
harbours.  
Despite Graham’s public assertions that settlements were intended to fulfil the Crown’s 
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi rather than erase or undermine them, Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators still wanted to ensure that the Crown’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi 
continued after settlement.76 Waikato-Tainui felt that their land-based raupatu settlement 
would only extinguish Waikato-Tainui’s Treaty of Waitangi rights in relation to the grievance 
of raupatu. Waikato-Tainui legal advisors wrote to ToWPU officials:  
This settlement is a limited recognition of the Crown’s obligations by way of redress 
(the return of land) for the specific injustice of the Raupatu, and those special rights 
(the rangatiratanga of Waikato under the Treaty) are not, and must not, be affected by 
this Settlement. The danger to Waikato of not making specific reference in this Deed 
to the rangatiratanga of Waikato under the Treaty is that Waikato is open to an 
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argument, at some time in the future, that this Settlement is a settlement of Waikato’s 
rangatiratanga, that Waikato has accepted a position which limits Waikato’s 
rangatiratanga to a return of land.77  
 
The issue of finality was still a large concern for Waikato even though the river and harbours 
had been excluded from their claim. Mahuta stressed to Graham in an early May 1995 meeting 
that the issue of the Crown’s affirmation of Waikato-Tainui’s rangatiratanga, especially in 
relation to Waikato-Tainui claims to the Waikato River and West Coast Harbours, had 
repeatedly been raised at consultation hui and that it was important to whether or not the 
settlement was accepted. In response to concerns about rangatiratanga rights, the Crown had 
amended the draft final deed of settlement to specifically state that the settlement would not 
diminish the Treaty of Waitangi or any of its articles but Mahuta stressed that this did not go 
far enough for Waikato-Tainui negotiators.78  
 The inclusion of the direct reference to rangatiratanga rights remained a problem even 
after the Deed of Settlement was signed on 22 May 1995, as discussions occurred in July 1995 
just before the first draft of the legislation was introduced to Parliament. Waikato-Tainui legal 
advisor Gerard Brown questioned why the inclusion of rangatiratanga rights was unacceptable 
to the Minister? Crown officials replied, much as they did to Ngāi Tahu when they were 
negotiating with the Crown over the development of their legal personality, that the term was 
undefined and that it would “introduce uncertainty into the Deed of Settlement.”79 Eventually 
the Crown agreed during the meeting to include the reference to rangatiratanga rights as a part 
of the detailing of the Treaty of Waitangi at the beginning of the settlement legislation. 
Nonetheless, the first draft of the legislation contained the Treaty of Waitangi only in English 
in the preamble and thus there was no direct reference to rangatiratanga. The final legislation 
contained the Treaty of Waitangi in both English and Māori. A direct reference to 
rangatiratanga and Waikato-Tainui’s claims to the River remained, even if the protection 
memorials on the titles of lands across the River did not.80 
 
Conclusion 
The return of land to Waikato-Tainui was an important part of their Treaty settlement.  
Waikato-Tainui’s focus on the return of land as the central component of their settlement was 
emblematic of their desire to have the maximum amount of land returned. This focus also 
reflected the specific context of Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations, since their settlement was 
restricted to the return of land rather than other conservation issues. Waikato-Tainui sought 
mechanisms to retain the land and pushed for a form of customary title under which returned 
lands would be inalienable. Waikato-Tainui was concerned regarding the continuing alienation 
of Crown lands in its tribal rohe during the negotiations. The development of a protection 
mechanism to allow Waikato-Tainui the opportunity to reserve certain Crown lands for use in 
a future settlement, the land-bank, slowed the alienation of Crown land but it was only 
established four years after it was first developed by Crown officials. Ngāi Tahu were able to 
have a land-bank established in 1990 and perhaps the weight and backing of the Waitangi 
Tribunal was vital, which released reports into the Ngāi Tahu claim from 1991. During the 
closing hearings Presiding Officer Judge Ashley McHugh asked the Crown to develop a system 
for protecting Crown lands from alienation. A nation-wide Protection Mechanism Scheme for 
the protection of Crown land came into place in 1993; it is unclear from the evidence available 
if it had any impact on the establishment of the Waikato-Tainui land-bank. The Waikato-Tainui 
land-bank system was not perfect, it came four years after it was proposed and it often frustrated 
Waikato-Tainui, but it was an innovative method to protect at least some Crown lands from 
alienation.  
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In the late-nineteenth century King Tawhiao had laid down the basis for resolving 
Waikato-Tainui grievances regarding the confiscation of land: as land was taken, so land must 
be returned. The 1995 settlement fulfilled that condition in part: not all Crown lands were 
returned, and they were often not returned under the title arrangements preferred by Waikato-
Tainui. The Crown controlled the parameters and limits of the process, but nonetheless at long 
last some land was finally returned. As a significant land-owner in the Waikato, the iwi has 
expanded its political and economic influence both regionally and nationally. Even if some 
lands still remain in Crown ownership in the Waikato confiscation rohe, the reclamation of 
Waikato-Tainui’s turangawaewae (or place to stand) has been given a significant boost.  
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